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HOW MANY PLAINTIFFS ARE ENOUGH?
VENUE IN TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS
Piper Hoffman*
This Article critiques the recent rash offederal district court opinions holding that
all named plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit alleging employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must satisfy the venue require-
ments in the court where they filed the action. Neither the text nor the history of
Title VII requires this prevailing interpretation; to the contrary, requiring every
named plaintff to satisfy venue requirements in the same court undermines the
legislative purpose behind both Title VII and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by
creating a new obstacle to employees seeking to enforce federal anti-discrimination
laws and vindicate their rights. Though the district court opinions have all
reached the wrong conclusion, no appellate court has ruled on this issue either
way, and no academic article has addressed the issue.
Title VII, which was intended to expand plaintiffs' options for venue, gives plain-
tiffs three choices of venue plus an additional "last resort" venue if the defendant
is not available in any of the first three places. Rule 23, which governs the certifi-
cation offederal class actions, was intended to encourage employees to bring class
actions against employers that discriminated against them as a class. But the pre-
vailing interpretation of Title VII's venue provision narrows plaintiffs' venue
choices and erects a new barrier to Rule 23 class certification that forces plaintiffs
to either litigate in their last resort venue or to abandon the nationwide class ac-
tion vehicle and proceed in individual or statewide actions instead.
The prevailing interpretation also makes little sense as a matter of judicial econ-
omy. It will inevitably lead to more procedural complexity and duplicative
litigation, and it is inconsistent with interpretations of other Title VII procedural
requirements, such as the filing and exhaustion requirements.
This Article calls for examination and reversal of the trend of rulings requiring all
named plaintiffs to satisfy venue in Title VII class actions, and adoption of a rule
granting venue to all class members as long as one named plaintff satisfies the
venue requirements.
* J.D., Harvard Law School, 1999; Director of Advocacy, The Partnership for the
Homeless, New York, NY, and Adjunct Professor of Employment Discrimination Law, New
York Law School; former Partner at Outten & Golden LLP, New York, NY. The author thanks
Professors Scott Moss and Nantiya Ruan and attorneys Brad Seligman, Kelly Dermody, Eliza-
beth Alexander, and Adam Klein for their feedback on this Article, and thanks Aviv Roth for
his unflagging support and encouragement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Class action lawsuits alleging employment discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' are often brought by more
than one named plaintiff. Every federal court to consider the issue
explicitly has held that it is not enough for one of the named
plaintiffs to satisfy the venue requirements in the court in which
they filed the action. Instead, courts have held that each and every
named plaintiff must individually satisfy the venue requirements in
the same federal district court.2 Neither the text nor the history of
Title VII requires this holding; to the contrary, courts are under-
mining the legislative purpose behind both Title VII and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23") by requiring every named
plaintiff to satisfy venue in the same court. This burdensome re-
quirement creates a new obstacle to employees seeking to enforce
federal anti-discrimination laws and vindicate their own rights.
This onerous interpretation of Title VII's venue provision is in
line with the increasing number of federal rulings that erect un-
necessary procedural barriers to, and narrow the substantive rights
of, Title VII plaintiffs. 3 Judicial hostility to Title VII claims may be
the best explanation for this interpretation of Title VII, which di-
rectly conflicts with the legislative intent of the statute and with
judicial interpretations of analogous statutes.
The Northern District of California was the first court to explic-
itly4 decide whether each named plaintiff in a Title VII class action
must individually satisfy venue in Crawford v. U.S. Bancorp PiperJaf-
1. Title VII refers to the federal statute banning employment discrimination. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to 2000e-17 (2000).
2. This Article refers to this holding as "the prevailing interpretation."
3. See Minna Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REv. 927,
931 n.15 (2006) (collecting examples of federal judges complaining about employment
discrimination cases); see also Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REv. 587, 616 n.140 (2000) (analyzing disproportionate
number of summary judgment rulings against discrimination plaintiffs); Johnny Clyde
Parker, Civil Rights Legislation: Getting Black Executives Off First Base in Professional Team-Sports,
1986 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 219, 226 (1986) (discussing courts deference toward employers in
discrimination cases); Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive
Payments to Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMPL. RTs. & EMP.
POL'YJ. 395, 402 (2006) (finding that since the 1980s the judiciary has become less friendly
to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases).
4. Title VII class actions have proceeded where fewer than all named plaintiffs satis-
fied venue, but the courts in those cases did not rule explicitly on whether Title VII requires
every named plaintiff to satisfy venue in the same district. See, e.g., Beckmann v. CBS, Inc.,
192 F.R.D. 608, 610 (D. Minn. 2000) (discussing a nationwide gender class action with
named plaintiffs in three states); Haynes v. Shoney's, Inc., No. 89-30093-RV, 1992 WL
752127, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. June 22, 1992) (discussing a Title VII multi-state race discrimina-
tion class action litigated in Florida against company headquartered in Nashville).
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fray, Inc.5 The Crawford court denied the plaintiffs' motion to add
two named plaintiffs who did not meet the venue requirements of
the district in which the putative gender discrimination class action
was pending. Just a few months later, the same court ruled in Dukes
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. that every named plaintiff must satisfy6
venue, severing four named plaintiffs who did not individually sat-
isfy the venue requirements in the Northern District of California
while allowing the gender discrimination class action to proceed
with the remaining two named plaintiffs.7 The District Court for
the District of Columbia ruled similarly in Quarles v. General Invest-
ment & Development Co.,8 a putative race discrimination class action,
finding that only one of the four named plaintiffs satisfied the
court's venue requirements. In Amochaev v. Citigroup Global Markets,
Inc., a gender discrimination class action on behalf of female Smith
Barney stockbrokers, the court dismissed one of five named plain-
tiffs, a woman who lived in a different state from the judicial
district, for lacking venue in that district.9
Title VII gives plaintiffs several choices of venue: any federal dis-
trict court in the state in which the unlawful employment practice
allegedly took place, "in the judicial district in which the employ-
ment records relevant to such practice are maintained and
administered," or "in the judicial district in which the aggrieved
person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice." ° If, and only if, the employer is "not found" in any
of those districts, venue will lie in "the judicial district in which the
respondent has his principal office."" This fourth provision may be
called the "last resort" venue clause.
The prevailing interpretation of Tide VII's venue provision ef-
fectively turns the statute on its head. Congress's clear legislative
intent was to make venue broader under Title VII than under the
default federal venue provision." The prevailing interpretation in-
stead makes venue narrower under Title VII by giving defendants
the ability to use the "last resort" venue clause as a weapon (1) to
gain home-court advantage, by forcing multi-state and nationwide
claims into courts in their principal places of business or (2) to
splinter a nationwide class action into a number of regional or
5. No. G-00-1611-PJH (N.D. Cal.July 23, 2001) (unpublished order).
6. No. C-01-2252-MJj, 2001 WL 1902806, at *2, *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3,2001).
7. Id. at *9.
8. 260 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2003).
9. No. C-05-1298-PJH, 2007 WL 484778, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12,2007).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (3) (2000).
11. Id.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000).
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even individual lawsuits. A defendant could splinter a class action
by knocking out all named plaintiffs except for those from one
single judicial district and then argue against class certification un-
der Rule 23, the rule governing the certification of class actions
under Title VII, on the grounds that the remaining named plain-
tiffs are not adequately representative of a geographically diffuse
class.
In this way the prevailing interpretation undermines not only
the purpose behind Title VII, but also that behind Rule 23, which
is intended to encourage employees to band together to vindicate
their statutory rights.
The operation of Title VII and Rule 23 together has allowed
large groups of employees to challenge broadly discriminatory
employer policies. Indeed, since the late 1960s, private class action
suits have been perhaps the most important means for challenging
and eliminating systemic employment discrimination, one of the
principal goals of Title VII. 3
This is no accident. "[O]ne of the purposes of the 1966 amend-
ment to Rule 23, as stated by the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules, was to enable the maintenance of a class action
'where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a
class.' ,,14 By requiring every named plaintiff representing a Title VII
class to satisfy venue, courts have given defendant employers one
more weapon against individual employees, who already fight an
uphill battle in seeking compensation for past discrimination and
an end to future discrimination, and they have also stymied the
goals of the drafters of Title VII and Rule 23-fostering class litiga-
tion and enforcing employees' civil rights.
The prevailing interpretation of Title VII's venue provision
causes a number of other undesirable effects. It makes little sense
as a matter of judicial economy, as it will inevitably lead to more
procedural complexity and duplicative litigation. Furthermore,
while the principle of venue is intended in part to protect parties
from having to litigate in inconvenient locations,' 5 the prevailing
interpretation of Title VII's venue provision can force plaintiffs,
who are least able to bear the extra costs, to litigate in the poten-
tially inconvenient forum of the defendant's hometown.
13. Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive, 37 AKRON L. REv.
813, 816 (2004).
14. Richmond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151, 158 (D. Va.
1974) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note).
15. JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 7.01 (2005) ("[V]enue statutes are generally concerned with the convenience of the
parties. ..").
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Despite the importance of this procedural matter for high-
impact civil rights class actions and despite the courts' consistently
wrong rulings, there appears to be virtually no academic attention
to this topic. 6 The venue literature addresses broad matters such as
the importance of having an expansive Title VII venue provision,
but not the specific matter of whether, in a Title VII class action,
each named plaintiff must satisfy the venue requirements inde-
pendently.
Part II of this Article discusses the history and significance of Ti-
tle VII litigation. Part III describes Title VI's special venue
provision, contrasts it with the general default venue provision, and
analyzes the legislative intent behind it. This analysis demonstrates
that Congress intended tot give Title VII plaintiffs a choice in their
selection of venue and to protect that choice. Part IV examines and
critiques the district court opinions that have required every
named plaintiff in Title VII class actions to individually satisfy
venue. Part V discusses the role of the federal class certification
rule, Rule 23, in Title VII class actions and how the prevailing in-
terpretation of Title VII's venue provision undermines the rule's
purpose. Part VI contrasts the prevailing interpretation of Title
ViI's venue provision with the much more liberal interpretation of
the same statute's filing and exhaustion requirements. Part VII
considers the practical consequences of the prevailing interpreta-
tion of Title VII's special venue provision. Part VIII proposes a new
rule granting venue to all Title VII class members where one
named plaintiff satisfies the venue requirements.
16. See, e.g., Crawford v. U.S. Bancorp PiperJaffray, Inc., No. 00-1611-PJH, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. July 23, 2001) ("Neither party has cited any authority that addresses the specific issue of
whether, when a widespread pattern of discrimination is alleged, venue is appropriate in a
state in which only some of the named plaintiffs have suffered discrimination."). One article
briefly discusses Dukes v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., No. C-01-2252-M[J, 2001 WL 1902806 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 3, 2001), as part of a practitioner-oriented summary of the law of venue under Title
VII. Elizabeth Lawrence, See You In Court, But Which Court? Venue In Title VI Class Actions, 10
EMPL. RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 639, 642-43 (2006).
17. See, e.g., Joel P. Bennett & Alice L. Covington, Changes Needed in the Federal Employ-
ment Discrimination Laws, 25 How. L.J. 273-274 ("[T]he special venue provisions of Title VII
evidence a congressional intent to focus on the plaintiffs right to choose the forum for an
employment discrimination action .... That Congress should create a special provision to
broaden the plaintiffs choice of venue is in keeping with the major policy considerations
behind Title VII as a whole. As the exclusive employment discrimination remedy for claims
of race, sex, religion or national origin employment discrimination, the statute includes
provisions which assist the litigation attempts of the victim of discrimination, who is at a
relative disadvantage in light of the employer's greater financial and legal resources."); Law-
rence, supra note 16, at 639, 642-43 (2006) ("Title VII has special venue rules, giving
plaintiffs more choices than typically permitted under the general venue statute." There-
fore, "a plaintiff's choice of forum should be given greater deference where a case arises
under Title VII, to acknowledge the intent of Congress to expand available fora for civil
rights plaintiffs.").
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II. TITLE VII LITIGATION HAS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE AND REMAINS AN
IMPORTANT WEAPON IN THE CONTINUING BATTLE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Congress' passage of Tide VII was a watershed in the battle
against employment discrimination. " [T] he statute's legislative his-
tory makes clear that it was intended to perform a public function
that Congress recognized was beyond the resources of government:
to rid the workplace of discrimination."'s Congress effectively
deputized private citizens to perform this important public func-
tion by enforcing the new law against discriminating employers.
There is no question that the lawsuits private employees brought
under Title VII significantly reduced overt discrimination in the
American workplace, but sadly, the job is not yet finished.
" [E] mpirical evidence shows that the wage gap has not closed and
most employment commentators agree that discrimination, in all
its forms, continues to plague American workplaces."' 9
Class actions are an indispensable weapon against today's em-
ployment discrimination.
Individual litigation has not been effective in combating per-
sistent workplace discrimination. One case at a time, although
important for the individual employee, does not effectively
deter companies from systemic discrimination against women
or people of color, especially with so many discrimination
cases settled on a confidential basis for purely monetary relief.
Instead, it is the threat of class-wide litigation, with the result-
ing larger damages calculations, sweeping (and expensive)
injunctive relief, and public non-confidential resolutions,
which provides a meaningful incentive for companies to
monitor and investigate the impact of their policies and prac-
tices. °
18. Kotlin, supra note 3, at 933-34 (citing 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) (2000)); S. REP. No. 94-
1011, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910-11.
19. Ruan, supra note 3, at 406-07 (citing Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling, 25
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2002)) (cataloging empirical evidence of ongoing discrimination in
contemporary labor markets); see also Lawton, supra note 3, at 595 ("[B]y all objective meas-
ures, white men still are doing significantly better in the workplace than blacks and
women."); Parker, supra note 3, at 219 ("It would be unrealistic.., to believe that this [im-
provement in blacks' status and treatment in the workplace] would have occurred in the
absence of civil rights legislation.").
20. Ruan, supra note 3, at 407-08 (internal citation omitted).
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This is why "private class action suits have been perhaps the most
important means for challenging and eliminating systemic em-
ployment discrimination, one of the principal goals of Title VII.
2
1
III. TITLE VII's SPECIAL VENUE PROVISION EXPANDS AND
PRIVILEGES PLAINTIFFS' SELECTION OF VENUES
A. The Language of Title VII Offers Plaintiffs More Choices
of Venue than the General Statutory Venue
Provision for Federal Lawsuits
Tide VII contains a unique venue provision that offers a single
lawsuit venue in several different judicial districts: (1) in any fed-
eral district court in the state in which the unlawful employment
practice is alleged to have been committed, (2) "in the judicial dis-
trict in which the employment records relevant to such practice are
maintained and administered," or (3) "in the judicial district in
which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged
unlawful employment practice. 22 Tide VII offers one more venue
option, but it is available only if the employer "is not found" in any
of the districts identified in the first three provisions. In that case
only, venue will lie "within the judicial district in which the respon-
dent has his principal office. 23 This fourth, or "last resort" clause,
"permits venue to be based on it only if venue under the other
three provisions cannot be found; thus, its use is relatively rare. 24
For claims arising under federal statutes that do not include
their own venue provisions, Congress provided a general or default
venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.25 Title VII plaintiffs may not
invoke this general venue provision, because the "venue provisions
of Section [2000e-5 (f) (3) of Title VII] are the sole and exclusive
venue provisions and cannot be supplemented by the general
21. Hart, supra note 13, at 816.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (3) (2000).
23. Id.; see also Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (holding venue improper under Title VII in district in which defendant had prin-
cipal office because the action could have been brought in one of the judicial districts
enumerated specifically and venue is available in the district in which the defendant has his
principal office only ifjurisdiction cannot be obtained in the other three named districts).
24. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 641-642.
25. Where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity rather than a federal question,
venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a); for federal questions, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) gov-
erns. City of Waco v. Schouten, 385 F. Supp. 2d 595, 599 (D. Tex. 2005) ("The general venue
statute ... governs venue of all claims brought in federal court except where venue is oth-
erwise provided by law.") (internal quotations omitted).
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venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391."26 Title VII gives plaintiffs
more possible venues than does the general federal venue provi-
sion. The general venue provision establishes venue for federal
question cases only in:
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides,8 if all de-
fendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in
which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise
to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action is situated, or (3) ajudicial district in
which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in
which the action may otherwise be brought.
29
The contrast between this general venue provision and the far
broader provision in Title VII demonstrates that Title VII provides
plaintiffs with far greater choice in venues.
B. Congress Intended to Give Title VII Plaintiffs a
Broad Selection of Venues
The choice of venues enjoyed by Title VII plaintiffs is no acci-
dent-Congress intended Title VII to give plaintiffs a broader
selection of venues, whether in individual or class cases, than
would otherwise be available to them under the general venue
provision. "Congress expanded the available fora to plaintiffs griev-
ing civil rights violations, thereby expressing intent to broaden a
Title VII plaintiffs choice of forum."3 ° "Title VII's broad venue
26. United States v. Trucking Mgmt. Inc., No. 74-453, 1979 WL 278, at *11 (D.D.C.July
17, 1979); see also Pierce v. Shorty Small's, 137 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1998); Bolar v. Frank, 938
F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[W]ell settled principles of statutory construction dictate that
the later, specific venue provision (§ 2000e-5(f) (3)) applies rather than the earlier, general
venue provision (§ 1391 (e)).");Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores, 950 E2d 586 (9th Cir. 1991);
Gwin v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., No. 01C770, 2001 WL 775969, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 10,
2001) ("Section 5(f)(3) is not simply a supplement to 28 U.S.C. § 1391; it is the exclusive
venue provision for all Title VII discrimination actions."); Richard Corn, Pendent Venue: A
Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 979 (2001).
27. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 372 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (D. Cal. 2005) ("[T]he
special venue provision of Title VII broadens the range of appropriate venues available to a
plaintiff.... ."); Lawrence, supra note 16, at 645 ("Title VII has special venue rules, giving
plaintiffs more choices than typically permitted under the general venue statute.").
28. A corporate defendant resides "in any judicial district in which it is subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) (2000).
29. Id. § 1391 (b).
30. E!/is, 372 F.Supp.2d at 537 (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Prod., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 504 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Lawrence, supra note 16, at 645
("[T]he intent of Congress [in Title VII was] to expand available fora for civil rights plain-
tiffs.... -).
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provision 'was necessary to support the desire of Congress to afford
citizens full and easy redress of civil rights grievances.' -3
Courts typically give substantial deference to Congressional in-
tent in enacting special venue provisions like the one in Title VII.
In interpreting these provisions, "courts seek to glean the Legisla-
ture's intent in passing the provision at issue. 'The court will not
look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be
used, but will take in connection with it ... the objects and policy
of the law.' ,32
Title VII's legislative history33 demonstrates Congress's intent to
expand plaintiffs' choices of venue. The House bill provided venue
in only two possible districts: "the district in which the unlawful
employment practice occurred or in the district of the respon-
dent's principal office."34 The Senate bill revised that provision of
the House bill, providing venue in four or more possible districts,
and the full Congress passed the Senate's version of the venue pro-
vision.35 This history demonstrates a conscious choice by Congress
to expand the number of venues available to Title VII plaintiffs.
Furthermore, Congress intended that, in the vast majority of Ti-
tle VII cases, the plaintiffs would truly have a choice of fora: it
created three alternative means of establishing venue and rele-
gated the location of the employer's headquarters to the forum of
last resort, expecting that it would be "the rare case" in which that
would be the only district where venue was proper.36
Corroborating the congressional intent to expand venue for dis-
crimination cases is the broader congressional intent to encourage
litigation under Title VII through plaintiff-friendly rules such as
fee-shifting for prevailing plaintiffs37 and the availability of broad
injunctive relief.38 Thus, there is ample evidence of congressional
31. Ellis, 372 ESupp.2d at 537 (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Prod., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 504 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ.,
935 F.2d 1240, 1248 (11 th Cir. 1991); Ashworth v. E. Airlines, 389 F Supp. 597, 601 (E.D. Va.
1975).
32. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., No. C-01-2252-Mjj, 2001 WL 1902806, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 3, 2001) (quoting Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535 (1980)).
33. The court in Dukes ruled against the plaintiffs on the question of venue in part be-
cause they "failed to cite any legislative history that supports their construction of Title VII's
special venue statute." Id. at *6. As demonstrated in this paragraph, the legislative history of
Title VII fully supports the argument put forth by the plaintiffs in Dukes.
34. 110 CONG. REc. 12723 (1964).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (2000) ("In any action or proceeding under this subchapter
[42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to 2000e-17] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party
... a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs .... ").
38. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976) (granting broad relief
to plaintiffs under Title VII because "attainment of a great national policy must not be
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intent to alter the general rules governing federal lawsuits-e.g.,
narrow venue provisions, the fact that each party bears its own
costs, and the availability of injunctive relief only where damage
remedies can be proven insufficient-to make it easier for plain-
tiffs to file lawsuits under Title VII than under most statutes.
Some courts have interpreted the Title VII venue provision in
light of that broad Congressional intent. Analyzing the first option
under the venue provision, the court in Gilbert v. General Electric Co.
observed that "it does not seem inconsistent with Congress' mili-
tant approach to affording citizens full redress of civil rights
grievances to allow plaintiffs a particularly wide latitude in choos-
ing the situs of their litigation. Such latitude affords greater
convenience to plaintiffs."
3 9
Even in non-Title VII cases, "[a] plaintiff's choice of forum is
generally given substantial weight."'' But a plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum is entitled to even more weight when it is made under a more
permissive venue provision, such as that found in Title VII.
4
'
"Where venue is governed by a more permissive standard, a plain-
tiff's choice is entitled to greater deference as a matter of law, even
where that case is brought as a class action."0
2
Making litigation convenient for multi-billion dollar corpora-
tions was inarguably not Congress's intent in enacting Title VII's
venue provision. To the contrary, Title VII is less concerned about
the possibility of plaintiffs "forum-shopping" than the possibility
"that national companies with distant offices might try to force
confined within narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in ordi-
nary private controversies." (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188
(1941))); Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981); Moseley v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 612 F.2d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1980) ("When a court determines
that a company has engaged in unlawful employment practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) gives
a district court the power to order such affirmative action as it may deem appropriate. The
district court is given broad discretion in this matter.").
39. 347 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (E.D. Va. 1972).
40. Geiger v. E.I. Dupont Nemours & Co., No. 96 CIV. 2757(LAP), 1997 WL 83291, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997) (collecting cases); Justin Cummins, Invigorating Labor: A Human
Rights Approach in the United States, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 58 (2005) ("Courts of Appeals
have reversed the district court's venue-based dismissal of claims when the district court
failed to defer sufficiently to a plaintiff's choice of forum.").
41. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 645 ("[A] plaintiffs choice of forum should be given
greater deference where a case arises under Title VII, to acknowledge the intent of Congress
to expand available fora for civil rights plaintiffs.").
42. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 372 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (D. Cal. 2005) (uphold-
ing Title VII plaintiffs' choice of venue and denying defendant's motion to transfer); see also
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Without question,
the intent of the venue and jurisdiction provisions of the securities laws is to grant potential
plaintiffs liberal choice in their selection of a forum, and unless the balance of factors is
strongly in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.")
(emphasis added).
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plaintiffs to litigate far away from their homes.... Forcing the
plaintiff to litigate in a federal court on the other side of the coun-
try would significantly increase the plaintiffs' cost of prosecuting
her action. 43 Congress intentionally broadened plaintiffs' choices
of venue under Title VII in order to encourage and facilitate pri-
vate enforcement of the federal civil rights law. "When the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement
would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part
upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance
with the law."" Therefore, Congress gave private litigants a broad
range of venue choices in order to make their valuable enforce-
ment efforts as convenient as possible.
IV. THE REASONING OF COURTS THAT HAVE REQUIRED EVERY
NAMED PLAINTIFF IN A CLASS ACTION TO SATISFY
TITLE VII's VENUE REQUIREMENT Is FLAWED
None of the handfu145 of cases holding that all named plaintiffs
must satisfy venue in a Title VII class action offers a persuasive ra-
tionale for their holding.
A. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Misinterpreted and
Misapplied the Precedents It Relied Upon
The Northern District of California's decision in Dukes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc.,46 holding that every named plaintiff in a Title VII
class action must satisfy venue, relied heavily on United States v.
Trucking Employers, Inc.,47 which held that venue need not be proper
as to absent members of a defendant class where it had been estab-
lished as to all named defendants. This reliance was unwarranted
for three reasons. First, the court in Trucking Employers did not con-
sider whether the text, history, or legislative intent behind Title
VII's venue provision required that all name0d plaintiffs in a class
action satisfy venue, nor did it address the conflict between such a
requirement and the policy behind Rule 23, as these questions
43. Passantino v.Johnson &Johnson Consumer Prod., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 505 (9th Cir.
2000) (interpreting Title VII's venue provision).
44. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968).
45. Some of the cases discussed in this Article are unpublished and are not available
on LexisNexis or Westlaw; it is possible that there are other cases addressing this issue that
are unpublished and therefore not accessible.
46. No. C-01-2252-MJJ, 2001 WL 1902806, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2001).
47. 72 ER.D. 98 (D.D.C. 1976).
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were not before it. Second, Trucking Employers was a decision of the
District Court for the District of Columbia. As a district court opin-
ion from a different circuit, Trucking Employers was not binding on
the Northern District of California.
Third, the outcome (and arguably the intent) of Trucking Em-
ployers was to permit a class action to proceed, making it a shaky
foundation for the Dukes decision to weaken a class action by re-
moving four of its six named plaintiffs. In Trucking Employers, the
defendants, rather than the plaintiffs, were the class. The defen-
dants sought to use venue rules to limit the geographic scope and
size of the class. But the court in Trucking Employers rejected this
challenge to the class, determining that venue was sufficient and
allowing the class action to proceed. As the court noted, using the
venue rules to weaken a class action "would effectively eviscerate
the historic function of the class suit and render Rule 23 largely
useless."48 Yet Dukes did exactly that, contravening this note of cau-
tion from the main precedent on which it purported to rely.
The Dukes court attempted to distinguish two cases in which
courts concluded that venue provisions in other statutes need be
satisfied by only one plaintiff, but it failed to articulate a relevant
distinction between those statutes and Title VII.
1. The Dukes Court's Attempt to Distinguish Exxon: Asserting
a Difference in Two Statutes' Legislative Histories
Where None Actually Exists
To distinguish Exxon Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission,9 the
Dukes court attempted to differentiate the statute Exxon relies
upon, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), from Title VII. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) gov-
erns venue in claims filed against federal agencies or federal
officers and, like the Title VII venue provision, affords plaintiffs
four different methods for satisfying venue. In Exxon, a multi-
plaintiff declaratory relief action, the Third Circuit rejected the
notion that every plaintiff must satisfy venue because it "would re-
sult in an unnecessary multiplicity of litigation. The language of
the statute itself mandates no such narrow construction. There is
no requirement that all plaintiffs reside in the forum district."
00
48. Id. at 100.
49. 588 F.2d 895 (3rd Cir. 1978).
50. Id. at 898-99.
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This principle is well-settled: every federal court to consider the
question since 1971 has ruled the same way.5'
It is noteworthy that many of the cases holding that not all the
plaintiffs need to satisfy venue were not class actions. Thus the
courts have not held merely that absent class members need not
satisfy venue, as countless federal courts have held even under Title
VII. Rather, this well-settled line of cases holds that plaintiffs who
are active, present parties need not all satisfy venue as long as one
of them does.
Section 1391 (e) shares with Title VII a legislative intent to ex-
pand plaintiffs' venue choices to facilitate private litigation. In
Stafford v. Briggs,53 the Supreme Court noted that, before § 1391 (e)
was enacted, the District of Columbia was the only district in the
nation in which venue was proper for private parties to sue federal
government employees or agencies.4 The Supreme Court found
that in enacting § 1391 (e), "Congress intended nothing more than
to provide nationwide venue for convenience of individual plain-
tiffs." 5 5 The determinative factor in Congress's decision to expand
venue in this provision was not that § 1391(e) applies to suits
against the government; Congress expanded the venue options
because it disapproved of allowing plaintiffs only one option for
venue.
The Dukes court admitted that "Stafford makes clear that Con-
gress passed Section 1391 (e) to rectify specific venue and
51. See Sidney Coal Co. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 427 F.3d 336, 344-345 (6th Cir. 2005)
("Each court faced with the same issue has" found that "§ 1391 (e) (3) contains no require-
ment that all plaintiffs must reside in the same district."); A.J. Taft Coal Co. v. Barnhart, 291
F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1302 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (holding venue proper although only two out of
ninety-eight plaintiff coal-operators resided in the district); Favereau v. United States, 44 F.
Supp. 2d 68, 70 (D. Me. 1999); Minn-Dak Farmers Coop. v. Espy, 851 F. Supp. 1423, 1425 (D.
N.D. 1994); Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n. v. Burnley, 700 F. Supp. 1043, 1044-45 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) (permitting litigation to proceed although only two of four plaintiffs satisfied
venue where the policy challenged in the lawsuit would have nationwide effect); Jewish War
Veterans v. United States, 695 F Supp. 1, 3, n.3 (D.D.C. 1987) ("For venue to be proper, only
one of the plaintiffs need satisfy the residency requirement of section 1391 (e) (4)."); Garcia-
Mir v. Civiletti, 32 Fed R. Serv. 2d 509, 514 (D. Kan. 1981) ("There is no requirement, how-
ever, that venue be proven to be independently proper for each named plaintiff.");
Candarini v. Att'y Gen., 369 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D.N.Y 1974); Holtzman v. Richardson,
361 E Supp. 544, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3815 (2d ed. 1986) ("[C]ourts
... have held that only one plaintiff need satisfy the residency requirement.").
52. See, e.g., Sidney Coal 427 F.3d at 343-46; Exxon, 588 E2d at 898-99; Minn-Dak Farm-
ers, 851 F. Supp. at 1425; Nat'lAir Traffic Controllers, 700 F. Supp. at 1044-45.
53. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
54. Id. at 539-40.
55. Id. at 542.
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jurisdictional constraints."56  The Dukes court's discussion of
§ 1391 (e)'s legislative history does not contain a single mention of
whether Congress intended to require every named plaintiff in a
class action to satisfy its new venue requirements or whether one
properly-venued plaintiff would suffice. Despite the complete ab-
sence of this issue from the legislative history, the Dukes court
somehow reached the conclusion that the "Exxon court's rejection
of the proposition that every plaintiff must satisfy venue is amply
supported by the legislative history accompanying the adoption of
1391(e). 57
Having assumed an intent behind § 1391(e) that is not apparent
in the legislative history, the Dukes court then found an intent be-
hind Title VII's venue provision that directly contradicts the
legislative history, a history which evidences an intent to broaden
Title VII venue, as discussed above. Thus, the Dukes court's distinc-
tion between § 1391 (e) and Title VII based on legislative history is
an empty one, because both statutes are equally supportive of
broad venue and equally silent as to the specific issue of multiple-
plaintiff venue. The Dukes court decided not to follow Exxon in the
Title VII context solely on the basis of this flawed analysis of legisla-
tive history.
2. The Dukes Court's Attempt to Distinguish Finley:
Asserting a Dubious Distinction Between Lawsuits
Against Private and Public Entities
Dukes attempted to distinguish Finley v. National Endowment for the
Arts in the same way.58 The court in Finley applied Exxon to a differ-
ent statute, the Federal Privacy Act, which has its own special venue
provision. While the defendant in Finley argued that the Exxon rule
should not apply because the language of the special venue provi-
sion of the Privacy Act was arguably narrower than § 1391(e)'s
venue provision, the Finley court dismissed this argument as
"miss[ing] the point," and held that "if any plaintiff satisfies the venue
requirement of [the Privacy Act], the venue requirement is satisfied as to
the remaining plaintiffs. "59
56. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., No. C-01-2252-ME, 2001 WL 1902806, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 3, 2001).
57. Id.
58. 795 F.Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992), affd, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
59. Id. at 1467 (emphasis added).
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The Dukes court ruled, without a legal basis, that the holding in
Finley should not be extended to the Tide VII context because only
the government can be sued under the Privacy Act, while Tide VII
also allows suits against private parties.6° The Dukes court also of-
fered this cryptic distinction between § 1391 (e) and the Privacy
Act, on the one hand, and Title VII on the other: the former stat-
utes serve "to safeguard the public interest in informational privacy
by delineating the duties and responsibilities of federal agencies
that collect, store, and disseminate personal information about in-
dividuals."6' There is no explanation why this statutory purpose
should permit class actions where fewer than all the named repre-
sentatives satisfy the venue requirements, while the statutory
purpose of Tide VII-to safeguard the public interest in eliminat-
ing discrimination from the workplace and protecting Americans'
civil rights, often through private enforcement-should discourage pri-
vate enforcement by requiring all named representatives to satisfy
venue requirements.
Further, the original 1964 version of Tide VII, which enacted the
broad venue provision, allowed suits only against private employers,
not against public employers-indicating, if anything, a Congres-
sional view that suits against private parties should be allowed more,
not less, liberally than suits against governmental entities. Thus, it
seems backwards to deny Title VII the same broad venue as the
Privacy Act because the former allows suits against private entities
whereas the latter allows suits only against government entities.
B. Crawford, Amochaev, and Quarles Offer Little Rationale
for Their Narrow Venue Rulings
The other cases that have required all named plaintiffs in Title
VII class actions to satisfy venue have not explained the reasoning
behind their holdings in any detail.
The District Court for the District of Columbia in Quarles v. Gen-
eral Investment & Development Co. relied primarily on Trucking
Employers and Dukes in ruling that all named plaintiffs in a Title VII
class action must satisfy venue.62 In Quarles, only one of the four
named plaintiffs satisfied the venue requirements in the District of
Columbia.3 The court deferred its decision on whether to dismiss
the claims of the three named plaintiffs who did not satisfy venue
60. Dukes, 2001 WL 1902806, at *7.
61. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
62. 260 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003).
63. Id. at 7-8.
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or to transfer their claims to another district because it had not yet
decided whether to certify the putative class. 4
The court in Crawford ironically rested its ruling against the
plaintiffs, in part, on a principle designed to promote parties' con-
venience. The Crawford court, quoting a decision from the Eastern
District of Texas, reasoned that "[e]xcluding plaintiff class mem-
bers on venue grounds when those plaintiffs may not even be
required to appear would defeat rather than advance the conven-
ience and appearance-oriented purposes of venue."6 5 In other
words, since absent class members may not have to appear before
the court, they need not satisfy venue. The Crawford court, however,
did not take the next step along this line of analysis: the "conven-
ience and appearance-oriented purposes of venue" are not
compromised when the named plaintiffs themselves choose to liti-
gate in a district in which only some of them satisfy the venue
requirements. This leaves little justification for requiring every
named plaintiff to satisfy venue.6"
The Northern District of California did not offer extensive
analysis to support its ruling in Amochaev v. Citigroup Global Markets,
Inc. that all named plaintiffs in a Title VII class action must meet
the venue requirements in that district.67 The court noted that it
had not located any Ninth Circuit authority on point; instead, it
stated that its conclusion was "consistent with the conclusions of
other trial courts that have addressed this issue," citing Dukes, Craw-
ford, and Quarles."8
In sum, the cases that have adopted the prevailing interpretation
of Title VII's venue provision are a mix of lightly reasoned deci-
64. Id. at 13-14.
65. Crawford v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, No. 00-1611-PJH, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 23,
2001) (quoting Bywaters v. United States, 196 F.R.D. 458, 464 (E.D. Tex. 2000)).
66. The fact that venue is waivable further weakens the justification for requiring all
named plaintiffs to satisfy venue. MooRE ET AL., supra note 15, § 7.01 ("[N]o constitutional
rights are implicated by the venue statutes; and consequently, any rights conferred by the
federal venue statutes may be waived by the parties ... ."). If venue is not so critical that it
cannot be waived, it should not be so powerful that it can impede the enforcement of fed-
eral anti-discrimination laws. The doctrine of "pendent venue" is one example of courts
prioritizing the adjudication of substantive laws over strictly enforcing venue. Under pen-
dent venue, a court may hear multiple causes of action that arise from the same nucleus of
operative facts, even where venue is established as to only one of those causes of action and
not as to all of them. Similarly, the difference between some named plaintiffs and all named
plaintiffs establishing venue is far too trivial to impede the lofty purposes of Title VII's pro-
hibition against workplace discrimination and Rule 23's facilitation of private enforcement
of civil rights. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1984); MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 7.06. The potential application of the pendent venue doctrine to multiple
parties as well as causes of action is a fertile area for further exploration.
67. No. C-05-1298-PJH, 2007 WL 484778, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007).
68. Id. at *1.
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sions (Amochaev, Quarles, Crawford) and highly flawed analysis
(Dukes). Given the lack of well-reasoned analysis of Title VII venue
in class actions, it is odd that the case law is so uniform, and all the
more odd that it is so uniformly wrong.
V. THE PREVAILING NARROW INTERPRETATION OF
TITLE VII's VENUE PROVISION IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE PURPOSES OF RULE 23
"As originally adopted in 1938, Rule 23 made a bold and well-
intentioned attempt to encourage more frequent use of class ac-
tions."69 Courts picked up the cause from Congress, holding that "if
there is to be an error made, let it be in favor and not against the
maintenance of the class action."7 ° This is especially true where the
class action seeks to enforce class members' civil rights under Title
VII. "We are committed to the proposition that Rule 23 should be
liberally construed to effectuate the remedial policy of Title VII
since the conduct therein proscribed is discrimination against a
class characteristic."'" Following this guidance is not difficult given
the harmony between Title VI's remedial policy and Rule 23's
purposes:
The federal courts have consistently held that the courts
must construe and interpret the class action procedural rule
to facilitate the various purposes of the rule, including to
promote judicial efficiency, to provide wronged persons with
a remedy when individual litigation is economically unrealis-
tic, and to protect the interests of absentee class members.
The underlying objectives of Rule 23 also supply meaningful
69. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 77 (2002).
70. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968) (citations omitted); see also
Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 1977); King v. Kan. City S. Indus., 519
F2d 20, 25--26 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Rule 23 must be liberally interpreted."); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir.
1968); Gregory S. Meece, Class Actions, Typicality, and Rule 1OB-5: Will the Typical Representative
Please Stand Up, 36 EMORY L.J. 649, 657-58 (1987) ("[T]he courts have generally opted for
a liberal interpretation of the requirements of Rule 23. A liberal interpretation policy is
supported by the command that courts are not to inquire into the merits of the case while
ruling upon the certification of a class action. In addition, the requirements themselves
indicate the desired policy of liberal interpretation."); Robert R. Simpson & Craig L. Perra,
Defendant Class Actions, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1319, 1324 (2000) ("Interpretation of the require-
ments for class certification should be liberally construed.").
71. Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 1975); see also
Long v. Thornton Twp. High Sch. Dist., 82 ER.D. 186, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1979); DuPree v. E.J.
Brach & Sons, 77 F.R.D. 3 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
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guidance for courts required to resolve disputes by applying
the rule.
Rule 23 class actions solve the problem of geographically diverse
individuals whose common claims against a single defendant could
lead to multiple duplicative actions, wasting judicial resources and
potentially yielding conflicting rulings. 73 "[Class] actions, which are
particularly appropriate and plentiful under Title VII, are often of
interstate or intrastate character, stretching in geographical impact
beyond the limits of particular divisions or state districts."74 Where
the class is nationwide in scope, geographically diverse named
plaintiffs confer a heightened level of class representation.7' Al-
though it is certainly not required by Rule 23, it is often in the best
interests of the class to have geographically diverse representa-
76tives. But requiring all named plaintiffs to satisfy the venue
requirements of the same judicial district all but precludes plain-
tiffs from offering a geographically diverse set of named plaintiffs
in a nationwide, or even a regional, case. Therefore the prevailing
interpretation of Title VII's venue provision could foreclose the
possibility of Rule 23 class actions against nationwide employers
who unlawfully discriminate.
By requiring all named plaintiffs in a class action to satisfy the
venue requirements in the same judicial district, the courts risk
undermining the efficiency offered by class litigation by splintering
nationwide cases into a multiplicity of smaller actions. Should
plaintiffs with nationwide claims choose not to (or find it too in-
convenient to) pursue their case in the defendant's home district,
they would be faced with the prospect of filing a series of state wide
cases, each with local plaintiffs. Worse, in small states or in states
72. MOORE ET. AL., supra note 15, § 14A.01.
73. Moore's Manual: Federal Practice and Procedure notes that:
The primary purpose of a class action is to obviate the need for many similarly situ-
ated claimants or defending parties to file or maintain separate lawsuits when
impractical to do so... when the parties' claims or defenses have identical or similar
questions of law and fact that arise from the same set of facts. The class action proce-
dure is designed to provide an economical, efficient, and expeditious device to
litigate multiple claims by proceeding with one lawsuit, rather than prosecuting mul-
tiple lawsuits to decide the same issues.
Id. § 14A.01.
74. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Go., 347 Supp. 1058, 1060 (E.D. Va. 1972).
75. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 642 ("[I]f a class is nationwide in scope, there should
be an advantage in having geographically diverse named plaintiffs representing the class.").
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (d) (3) advisory committee's note ("Subdivision (d) (3) reflects
the possibility of conditioning the maintenance of a class action, e.g., on the strengthening
of the representation .... ").
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that contain just a few of the employer's thousands of locations,
there may not be enough class members for a single-state class ac-
tion under Rule 23(a) (1), which permits class certification only
where "the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is im-
practicable."07  Thus, a large, nationwide employer with a
nationwide pattern of discrimination, such as those in Crawford or
Amochaev, may have only one or two dozen employees in a sparsely
populated state like Montana or in a small state like New Hamp-
shire and, therefore, may be able to avoid class-wide liability in
those states if it can force the plaintiffs to sue state by state rather
than in one nationwide class.7"
Since class actions under Title VII frequently include claims or
evidence suggesting that the employer discriminates against mem-
bers of the protected category in hiring, it is even more likely that
plaintiffs will not satisfy numerosity if the class is limited to em-
ployees working in one state. For instance, an employer may have
200 employees in New Hampshire, but if only 15 of them are
women, there is a good chance the employer is discriminating
against women-and paradoxically, little chance that a court would
find the statewide class sufficiently numerous to satisfy Rule 23.7
Furthermore, even if the number of potential class members in a
state is high enough that it would normally justify class certifica-
tion, a court may deny certification on the grounds that the
geographical proximity of the members means joinder is not im-
practicable.80
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
78. "Allowing overly strict interpretations of the venue provisions ... can easily result
in hardship in some jurisdictions due to a quirk of geography." Bennett & Covington, supra
note 17, at 276.
79. See, e.g., Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of certifica-
tion where there may have been as few as nine potential class members); Harik v. Cal.
Teachers Ass'n, 298 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2002) (vacating certification of classes based upon
lack of numerosity where teachers' associations contained only seven, nine, and ten mem-
bers); Berry v. Baca, 226 ER.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (denying certification because potential
class of 33 members did not satisfy numerosity requirement); Murray v. Norberg, 423 E
Supp. 795, 798 (D. R.I. 1976) (denying certification where class numbered "less than
twenty," becausejoinder was "clearly practicable").
80. See, e.g., Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (where
class is less numerous, factors such as geographical dispersion must be considered in deter-
mining impracticability of joinder); Colindres v. Quietfilex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347 (S.D. Tex.
2006) (geographical dispersion precluded joinder and therefore supported numerosity
finding under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1)); In re Veeco Instruments, Inc., Sec. Litig., 235 ER.D.
220 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (geographical diversity of putative class made joinder impracticable);
Sanft v. Winnebago Indus., 214 F.R.D. 514 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (where most potential class
members lived in northern Iowa, they were not geographically dispersed, and therefore, this
factor did not weigh in favor of finding that numerosity requirement had been satisfied).
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This outcome is particularly troubling given the possibility that the
total number of employees in all small and/or sparsely populated
states combined may comprise a substantial portion of the employer's
total workforce. Thus a large employer could shrink its potential
liability significantly through the apparently non-substantive, proce-
dural mechanism of challenging venue for geographically diverse
named plaintiffs.
If Title VII plaintiffs were prevented from bringing geographi-
cally broad class actions, their only remaining option would be to
bring smaller class actions, small multi-plaintiff actions, or individ-
ual actions. Although each of these actions would allege precisely
the same discriminatory pattern or practice, the parties and the
courts would be forced to bear the inefficiencies of litigating in
multiple forums rather than being able to consolidate their claims
before one court. In Title VII cases those inefficiencies would be
particularly egregious given that plaintiffs nationwide would rely,
for the most part, on the same evidence, such as the employer's
documented human resources policies, its documented complaint
procedures, the testimony of human resources professionals, and
statistical analyses suggesting company-wide discrimination. Even
with multi-district coordination for pre-trial purposes, the com-
plexity and expense of litigating the same issues in multiple venues
would be enormous, sometimes even prohibitive. The individual
plaintiffs in many Title VII class actions already face the prospect of
litigating against multi-billion dollar multinational corporations.
That economic imbalance"1 would only be exacerbated by the ne-
cessity of fighting the same battle on multiple fronts.
VI. THE PREVAILING NARROW INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII's
VENUE PROVISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH COURTS'
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF TITLE VII's FILING
AND EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENTS
In contrast with the narrow interpretation of Title VII's venue
provision, courts have liberally interpreted the Title VII procedural
requirements of filing and exhaustion. Federal courts have devel-
oped the single-filing, or piggyback, rule to permit multiple
employees to prosecute Title VII claims against their employer
even though only one employee has satisfied these statutory pro-
81. Bennett & Covington, supra note 17, at 274 (noting that the Title VII plaintiff is a
"victim of discrimination ... at a relative disadvantage in light of the employer's greater
financial and legal resources.").
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cedural requirements. Normally every employee who wants to sue
her employer under Title VII must first file an administrative
charge82 ("the filing requirement") with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and obtain a Notice of Right to Sue from
that agency83 ("the exhaustion requirement") before she may file
suit. Under the single-filing rule, however, "individuals who have
not exhausted their administrative remedies under Title VII [may]
piggyback onto another individual who has properly exhausted his
or her remedies., 84 In circuits that have adopted the single-filing
rule ,85 "in an action involving claims of several persons arising out
of similar discriminatory treatment, not all of them need to have
filed EEOC charges as long as one or more of the plaintiffs had satisfied
the requirement."86 This liberal interpretation of the filing and ex-
haustion requirements advances the important policy behind Title
VII's ban on workplace discrimination, rather than tying up efforts
at private enforcement of civil rights in procedural technicalities. 87
The filing requirement and the exhaustion requirement are
akin to the requirement that a plaintiff satisfy the venue provision
of Title VII. "Clearly each member of a class need not meet venue
requirements,, 88 and it is not clear why each named plaintiff repre-
senting the class should have to meet them. It should suffice for a
class action to proceed if one named plaintiff meets these re-
quirements, just as one named plaintiffs Notice of Right to Sue
satisfies Title VII's filing and exhaustion requirements for non-
representative class members as well as for fellow named plaintiffs.
Courts' failure to apply the Title VII venue provision with suffi-
cient breadth is all the more curious and anomalous given that
courts apply the proper broad interpretation to Title VII's filing
and exhaustion requirements. But even if courts' narrow
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (2000).
83. Id.
84. Matthew Sutter, Title VII & the ADA's Continuing Violation Theory and the Single Filing
Rule: A Guide to How to "Bootstrap" and "Piggyback" Stale Claims onto Fresh Ones, 23 QUINNIPIAC
L. REv. 299, 314-315 (2004).
85. At least seven circuits have adopted the single-filing rule. See Snell v. Suffolk
County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1986); Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 385-386
(3d Cir. 2007); Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 335 (4th Cir. 1983);
Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corp., 563 F.2d 1233, 1239 (5th Cir. 1977); Allen v.
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1977); Ezell v. Mobile
Hous. Bd., 709 F.2d 1376, 1381 (1lth Cir. 1983); Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1323 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
86. Crawford v. U.S. Steel Corp., 660 F.2d 663, 665 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added);
see also A. MacKenzie Smith & Cassandre Charles, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5
GEO.J. GENDER & L. 421, 437-438 (2004).
87. "An emphasis on procedural technicalities is inappropriate in Title VII litigation."
Bennett & Covington, supra note 17, at 276.
88. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 642.
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interpretation of venue in Title VII cases were not anomalous, it
still would be destructive, as the next Part explains.
VII. THE MISINTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII's VENUE PROVISION
WILL HURT VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION AND PREVENT
COURTS FROM STOPPING FUTURE DISCRIMINATION,
THUS UNDERMINING TITLE VII's PURPOSE
The question whether all named plaintiffs in a Title VII class ac-
tion must satisfy venue may seem like a tempest in a teapot given
that no court has dismissed a case in its entirety or refused to cer-
tify a class because of it. The courts that have ruled that all named
plaintiffs must satisfy the venue requirements and have chosen a
remedy have dismissed those named plaintiffs who did not satisfy
venue in those courts, while allowing the remaining named plain-
tiffs to proceed with the class action (and allowing the dismissed
named plaintiffs to benefit from the lawsuit as unnamed class
members).89 But the reduction in the number and geographic di-
versity of the named plaintiffs could weigh against certification in
some cases. Of the cases discussed in this Article, only Dukes yielded
an order granting class certification. 90
The damage these rulings do to Title VII classes is to potentially
preclude the recovery of injunctive relief. Some courts have held
that injunctive relief is available only to a class that has at least one
named plaintiff who still works for the defendant employer.9 In
89. See supra Part I.
90. See supra Part IV.
91. See, e.g., Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 448 (3d Cir. 1982) (citingJenkins
v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., 522 E2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1975) (the district court, by denying
"the plaintiff's motion to certify a class including all current employees of Blue Cross ...
effectively precluded the requested injunctive relief: because the plaintiff was no longer
employed," she lacked standing to obtain injunctive relief)); Harper v. Ulta Salon Cosmetics &
Fragrance, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-1285-TWT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38049, at *3-4 (D. Ga. Dec. 23,
2005) (order denying class certification) (former employee named plaintiffs "lack standing
to pursue a claim for injunctive relief," because as "former employees, the Plaintiffs will not
be injured by any allegedly discriminatory conduct occurring in the future and thus cannot
pursue relief on behalf of current employees."); Armstrong v. Powell, 230 F.R.D. 661, 680
(W.D. Okla. 2005) (if the two current employee named plaintiffs were dismissed, the re-
maining former employee named plaintiffs would not have standing to pursue injunctive
relief); Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 665 n.13 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(former employees had no standing to seek injunctive relief); Wright v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 201 F.R.D. 526, 546 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (former employee named plaintiffs "are inade-
quate class representatives because ... [they] have no ties to defendant or prospect of
benefit from the injunctive relief they are seeking."); Richmond Black Police Officers Ass'n
v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151, 157 (D. Va. 1974) (excluding former employees from
class because both named plaintiffs were current employees and therefore had much
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practice, it can be very difficult to find a current employee willing
to serve as a named plaintiff in a Title VII class action against her
employer and it can be impossible to find one who satisfies venue
within the confines of one particular district. Making things even
harder is the fact that current employees may become former em-
ployees during the often protracted course of litigation. Prudent
class counsel try to include multiple current employees among the
named plaintiffs to increase the likelihood that, by the time the
litigation reaches the remedy stage, there will still be at least one
named plaintiff who is a current employee.
There are other advantages to having multiple named plaintiffs.
Some named plaintiffs may decide to drop out of the case before it
is over if, for instance, they become ill 92 or, for other reasons, find
that serving as a named plaintiff has come to conflict with their
personal interests. Other named plaintiffs may be forced to relin-
quish their role after defendant employers mount focused attacks
on them personally. In attacking the "adequacy of representation"
showing by a class, the defendant may work very hard to portray a
named plaintiff as a liar in order to damage her credibility.9 s Even
if the defendant fails to prove the named plaintiff is an inadequate
class representative, the effort may succeed in knocking her out as
a named plaintiff if the attack is so harmful, either emotionally or
by putting the plaintiff at some risk of exposing negative informa-
tion, 4 that the plaintiff chooses not to remain in the litigation. Of
course, this is one reason it often makes tactical sense for defen-
dant employers to attack each named plaintiff personally, even
where the argument that a particular named plaintiff is an inade-
quate class representative is unlikely to succeed. The prevailing
interpretation of the Title VII venue statute gives defendants one
more way to knock out named plaintiffs.
The prevailing interpretation also gives defendant employers yet
another way to waste the plaintiffs' resources. Defendant employers
broader interests, including injunctive or declaratory relief, than former employees whose
only interest was recovering backpay).
92. Edgington v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 139 F.R.D. 183, 195 (D. Kan. 1991) (denying
class certification in part due to the "poor health" of the named plaintiffs).
93. See, e.g., Maddox & Starbuck, Ltd. v British Airways, 97 F.R.D. 395, 396-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (plaintiff convicted of unrelated criminal offense cannot fairly and adequately protect
class interest); In re Goldchip Funding Co., 61 F.R.D. 592, 594 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (certification
denied without prejudice because court lacked sufficient facts about the representatives'
personal qualities, such as their honesty and conscientiousness, which "are relevant, indeed
necessary, in determining whether 'the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class'" (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4))).
94. See, e.g., Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 87 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (defendants attacked named plaintiffs' adequacy on the grounds that their immigra-
tion status bore "on their potential credibility and fitness as class representatives").
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almost always have significantly more resources than individual
employees do and they can use that to their advantage by dragging
out the proceedings. They may cause delays in discovery or bring
meritless motions just to force plaintiffs' attorneys to spend time
and money fighting them. Employers hope that they will be able to
exhaust the plaintiffs, their counsel, or their wallets before a court
has a chance to rule against them on liability. Each of the cases dis-
cussed in this Article provides an example of this tactic: even
though defendants won their venue motions in each case, they did
not succeed in dismissing the cases. They did, however, succeed in
forcing plaintiffs and their counsel to brief, and in some cases ar-
gue, yet another motion.
The prevailing interpretation of the Title VII venue provision
gives defendant employers yet another incentive to bring a motion:
the chance that they could force the entire case into their own
home districts. The "last resort" clause in Title VII's venue provi-
sion provides for venue in the district in which the defendant has
its principal office if no other forum is available.96 For many large
corporations that dominate the towns in which they are headquar-
tered, the prevailing interpretation gives them a shot at
transferring a case from the venue the plaintiffs chose to their
home court. Being able to try their case in their own company
town can confer a substantial advantage on an employer. Title ViI's
venue provision is designed to provide plaintiffs with enough op-
tions so that they "may not be forced to bring suit in the
defendant's home court, as is much more likely under the general
venue provisions."'97 Yet the prevailing interpretation, in its blind-
ness to the legislative intent behind Title VII, can force plaintiffs
right into a defendant's home court.
As discussed above, the prevailing interpretation could also
harm employees and weaken the anti-discrimination cause 98 by
95. For instance, the court in Dukes noted that "[d] ismissal or transfer of the entire ac-
tion would be too harsh a penalty, especially since two of the six plaintiffs are properly
venued here. Instead ... the Court elects to dismiss the improperly venued plaintiffs, allow-
ing the case and the California plaintiffs to remain if they so choose." Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. C-01-2252-MJj, 2001 WL 1902806, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2001). Similarly,
the Amochaev court concluded that both dismissal and transfer of the case were too harsh
and permitted the remaining named plaintiffs to continue pursuing the case in the North-
ern District of California. Amochaev v. Citigroup Global Markets, No. C-05-1298-PJH, 2007
WL 484778, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (3) (2000).
97. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 639.
98. This Article has presented a number of illustrations of the conflict between Title
VII's purpose and the prevailing interpretation of Title VII's venue provision. This conflict
demonstrates that the prevailing interpretation violates a basic canon of statutory interpreta-
tion: "[w]hen interpreting the purpose of a provision, 'the court will not look merely to a
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making it difficult, if not impossible, for some plaintiffs, such as
those in small states or in areas where their employer has a limited
presence, to bring a class action. It is far more costly and difficult
for an employee to bring an individual discrimination lawsuit, for
which she may need to pay hourly attorney fees (as opposed to the
contingent fee arrangement that applies to class actions) and for
which a court is likely to deny the broad discovery necessary to
demonstrate a pattern of discrimination. It is far easier for an em-
ployer to explain away its adverse actions towards one minority
employee than it is to explain away a pattern of similar adverse ac-
tions against many minority employees. Conversely, it can be easier
for plaintiffs to demonstrate a class-wide pattern of race discrimina-
tion than to prove discriminatory intent in each individual
situation. For all these reasons, the seemingly trivial procedural
matter of requiring all named plaintiffs to establish venue in a Title
VII class action could make it impossible for employees to enforce
their federally-protected civil rights, despite the clear intent behind
Title VII and Rule 23 to grant this power to private victims of em-
ployment discrimination.
VIII. WHERE ONE NAMED PLAINTIFF SATISFIES VENUE, VENUE
SHOULD BE PROPER AS TO THE ENTIRE CLASS
Courts should decline to follow the prevailing interpretation
and instead adopt the rule that, where one named plaintiff satisfies
the venue requirements in a Title VII class action, venue is proper
as to the rest of the class, including both absent class members and
other named plaintiffs. This rule would fulfill the legislative intent
and policy purposes behind both Title VII and Rule 23.
IX. CONCLUSION
Title VII was intended to give plaintiffs a broad choice of venues
in which to sue discriminatory employers, and Rule 23 was in-
tended to create efficiencies and empower individuals to band
together to fight discrimination by their frequently large, wealthy
employers. Yet somehow a small number of federal district courts
have turned these rules against themselves. By ruling that all
particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it...
the objects and policy of the law.'" Sidney Coal Co. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 427 E3d 336, 343-
346 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535 (1980) (interpreting the
venue provision in § 1391 (e))).
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named plaintiffs in a Title VII class action must satisfy venue, these
few courts have created a new weapon for discriminatory employ-
ers to use to avoid legal liability for violating their employees' civil
rights.
A pattern of anti-employee rulings is emerging in Title VIi juris-
prudence.99 Venue is a little-noticed example of this pattern of
judicial hostility, but an important example, because some of the
highest-impact class actions live and die on these curious venue
holdings. Fortunately the ill-reasoned, unsupported prevailing in-
terpretation is not yet entrenched in the jurisprudence. No court
of appeals has addressed the issue, and some of the district court
opinions are unpublished and effectively inaccessible to practitio-
ners and to other judges. The authorities and arguments collected
in this Article can help future Title VII plaintiffs to attain Rule 23
class certification of nationwide classes and thus begin to build a
body of caselaw that furthers the goals of Title VII, of Rule 23, and
of all those who would banish discrimination from the American
workplace.
99. Examples of recent cases that unduly restricted employees' rights under Title VII
include Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (precluding
victim of years of pay discrimination from recovering damages where she had not chal-
lenged the first discriminatory action within months of its occurrence), and Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (denying many public employees protection from retaliation
for protesting employment discrimination). See Bennett & Covington, supra note 17, at 274
(detectable trend in some circuits to restrict plaintiffs' venue choices in employment litiga-
tion); see also supra note 3.
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